This note investigates the noncooperative foundations of von Neumann-Morgenstern (vN-M) stable sets in voting games. To do so, we study subgame perfect equilibria of a noncooperative legislative bargaining game, based on underlying simple games. The following results emerge from such an exercise: Every stable set of the underlying simple game is the limit set of undominated pure-strategy Markov perfect equilibria, and of strategically stable sets of undominated subgame perfect equilibria of the bargaining game with farsighted voters.
Introduction
Simple games also called voting games, or committees have played a major role in the formal theory of committee voting. The key ingredients in this type of cooperative game are: (i) a set of feasible alternatives; (ii) a set of committee members (or voters); (iii) the committee members' preferences over the set of feasible alternatives; and (iv) a collection of coalitions, called winning coalitions, which are all-powerful in that they can rule out any alternative irrespective of the other voters' behavior. The details of the institutional setting and the distribution of power among individuals lurk in this collection of winning coalitions.
Although the concept of stable set, as dened by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) , is central in the theory of cooperative games, it has so far received little attention from political scientists who study committee voting with the simple-game approach. 1 The main reason for this is the absence of informal but credible stories of individual interaction that would provide interpretations for stable sets in the context of voting games. Paraphrasing Ordeshook (1986) , the arguments for supposing that people choose outcomes in [stable] sets often remain obscure. 2 An important issue, then, concerns the extent to which stable set predictions reect the equilibrium predictions of credible noncooperative games of negotiation and coalition formation. Put dierently, given a stable set of a simple game, does there exist an institutional arrangement that implements the stable set?
The present note is concerned with developing strategic foundations for stable sets in simple games. The noncooperative framework we use to do so, legislative bargaining, is based on the above-mentioned ingredients of underlying simple games. At each stage in the negotiation, there is an initial status quo, and a committee member is given the opportunity to propose an alternative which is then voted up or down by the committee; if voted up, the alternative is implemented and becomes the new status quo; if voted down, the status quo remains unchanged and is implemented. An alternative is accepted if and only if the set of voters who accept the proposal is a wining coalition of the underlying simple game. The sequence repeats indenitely.
We answer the question: What reasons do we have to suppose that committees choose alternatives in stable sets? by proving that, when voters 1 The literature on the most familiar and widely-used solution concept, the core, is immense and will not be surveyed here. Le Breton and Weber (1992) derive necessary and sucient conditions for the core to constitute a vN-M stable set. Anesi (2006) shows that alternatives in stable sets generalize the usual corelike stability notion to dynamic cooperative settings.
2 In Ordeshook's book, stable sets are referred to as V -sets.
are suciently farsighted, every stable set of the underlying simple game is the limit set of undominated subgame perfect equilibria of the noncooperative bargaining game. We further show that some of those equilibria have desirable properties, namely Markov perfection and in particular strategic stability (as dened by Kohlberg and Mertens, 1986) , thus establishing a relationship between vN-M stability and strategic stability in voting games. This short note thus contributes to the literature on noncooperative foundations of cooperative solutions in voting games. These authors have developed noncooperative games of bargaining and coalition formation to provide strategic foundations for a variety of cooperative solutions. Although this literature is now too large for us to give an exhaustive survey here, we should just mention Harsanyi (1974) , who uses a dierent bargaining setting to provide strategic foundations for stable sets in TU games.
3 To the best of our knowledge, this note constitutes the rst attempt to provide noncooperative foundations for stable sets in a voting context with nontransferable utility. More distantly related to this note is the political economy literature on legislative bargaining models with an endogenous status quo. This includes Baron (1996) , Kalandrakis (2004) , Battaglini and Coate (2007a,b) , Battaglini and Palfrey (2007) , Duggan and Kalandrakis (2007) , and Diermeier and Fong (2009a,b) , to name a few.
We present the underlying simple game and the corresponding legislative bargaining game in Section 2. In Section 3, we state and prove the central result of this note.
Notation and Denitions

The Underlying Simple Game
Let N ≡ {1, . . . , n} denote the set of voters (or players), indexed by i, and let N ≡ 2 N \ {∅}. Each member of N is referred to as a coalition. Every voter i has preferences over a nite set of alternatives X. These preferences are represented by a linear order i on X. For future reference, we assume that, for every i ∈ N , i is represented by a von Neumann-Morgenstern payo function u i : X → R, such that for all (x, y) ∈ X 2 : x i y if and only
A simple game (or voting game) consists of a pair (N, W), where W ⊆ N is the collection of winning coalitions. Thus, we say that x ∈ X dominates y ∈ X if, and only if, there is a coalition S ∈ W such that u i (x) > u i (y), for every i ∈ S. Let D(y) denote the set of alternatives that dominate y. We assume throughout that W is:
A set of alternatives V ⊆ X is a stable set of (N, W) if, and only if, the two following conditions hold:
and
These two conditions are called internal stability and external stability, respectively. The existence and the uniqueness of stable sets is studied in Muto (1984) .
The Bargaining Game
We now present the legislative bargaining game based on (N, W).
Bargaining Procedure
In each of an innite number of discrete periods, indexed t = 1, 2, . . ., members of N have to collectively choose an alternativex t from X. The sequential bargaining process is as follows: At the start of each periodt, player i is chosen with probability p i > 0 to make a proposal y ∈ X; once the proposal is made, all players simultaneously vote yes or no. If the set of players who vote yes belongs to W then
t−1 is thus regarded as the status quo. For simplicity, we assume that the status quo of period 1, x 0 , is chosen by Nature according to probability
Once alternative x t has been chosen, every player i receives an instanta-
, where δ i is i's discount factor. Thus, player i's payo from a bargaining sequence {x
Strategies
A history at some stage of a given period t describes all that has transpired in the previous periods and stages (the sequence of proposers, their respective proposals and the associated pattern of votes). This stage may be of various kinds: a proposer is about to be selected, or a proposal about to be made, or voters about to vote, or an alternative about to be implemented. We must therefore distinguish between the corresponding types of histories: selection histories, proposer histories, voter histories, and implementation histories respectively.
A strategy σ i for a player i is a mapping that assigns a probability distribution over intended actions (what to propose, how to vote) to all conceivable proposer and voter histories. Formally, let ∆X be the family of probability distributions over X. and each x ∈ X, let π t i (h) (x) be the probability that proposer i makes proposal x at history h. Player i's voting strategy for period t is v
is the probability that i votes yes at voter history h. Thus, the full collection
is a strategy for i, and σ = {σ i } i∈N is a strategy prole.
For each h ∈ H t p , let r p (h) ∈ X be the status quo prevailing at h, and
2 be the pair (x, y) where x is the ongoing status quo and y is the proposal just made at h. For future reference, player i's strategy σ i is said to be:
− a pure strategy if and only if, for any period t: 
Every strategy prole σ generates a probability distribution over innite sequences of alternatives {x
The set of absorbing points of σ is then dened as
Equilibrium
As in the previous literature, we will concentrate on undominated subgame perfect equilibria (SPEs) namely SPEs in which no player uses a weakly dominated strategy and be particularly interested in Markov perfect equi-libria (MPEs) those in which players use Markovian strategies. However, another equilibrium renement will be used in the present note: Kohlberg' and Mertens' (1986) strategic stability.
4
A set Σ of Nash equilibria of the bargaining game is stable if it is minimal with respect to the following property:
(P) Σ is a closed set of equilibria satisfying: for any ε > 0 there exists some ζ 0 > 0 such that for any completely mixed strategy prole {σ i } i∈N and any numbers {ζ i } i∈N , with 0 < ζ i < ζ 0 , the perturbed game where every strategy s of player i is replaced by (1 − ζ i ) s + ζ i σ i has an equilibrium that is within ε of some equilibrium in Σ.
5
SPEs that form a stable set are consistent with both the ideas of backward and forward induction. We refer the reader to Kohlberg (1990) for an extensive discussion of the latter concept.
The name stable set should not cause confusion with von NeumannMorgenstern (vN-M) stable sets as long as it is understood that a vN-M stable set refers to a set of alternatives, whereas a strategically stable set refers to a set of strategy proles in the bargaining game. With this caveat in mind, we now turn to the implementation of vN-M stable sets in the noncooperative bargaining game.
Proposition 1 Let V ⊆ X be a stable set of the underlying simple game.
Then there exist a set of strategy proles, Σ * , andδ ∈ (0, 1) such that the following is true whenever min i∈N δ i >δ:
(ii) every σ * in Σ * is an undominated SPE;
(iii) Σ * includes a subset of Markovian pure-strategy proles; and (iv) Σ * includes a subset that is stable.
To prove Proposition 1, we rst dene Σ * andδ. For every x / ∈ V , pick an arbitrary element, say x, in the set V ∩ D(x) which, by external stability, is nonempty. For expositional convenience, we adopt the convention that x = x when x ∈ V . Note that, although there may be several functions, x → x, that satisfy these conditions, only one of them is chosen and kept xed throughout the proof of Proposition 1. Let Σ * be the closed set of strategy proles that satisfy the following conditions:
At the proposer history h ∈ H t p of period t with status quo x (namely x
At the voter history h ∈ H t v of period t with status quo x and proposal y, every responder i plays as follows: if y = x, then
and if y = x, then
Note that every σ * ∈ Σ * induces a time-independent transition process P σ * such that P σ * t = P σ * for any period t. We now deneδ. For each player i ∈ N , and every pair (x, y) ∈ X 2 such that
A brief inspection of the above denitions reveals that there existsδ
(and is therefore positive) whenever δ i >δ i (x, y). We deneδ as
We now prove that A(σ * ) = V . When the status quo, say x, is an element of V , the proposer oers a policy, say y, which is always rejected. Inspection of (6)-(7) indeed reveals that y is accepted if and only if there is a winning coalition of voters who all prefer y to x. But this is impossible since x and y both belong to V which is internally stable.
Suppose now that the status quo, say x, is not a member of V . This implies that x ∈ V ∩ D(x). Then, the coalition S of players who prefer x to x belongs to W. If the proposer is a member of S, then she proposes x which, according to (7), is accepted. If the proposer is not a member of S, she may propose another policy. But (6) tells us that this proposal is rejected: V satisfying internal stability, the elements of V cannot dominate each other. x consequently remains the status quo until the next period involving a proposer in S. In that period, the proposer successfully proposes x.
A brief observation of conditions (3)- (7) reveals that Σ * contains Markovian pure-strategy proles: If, at all proposer histories with status quo x, proposer k always makes the same proposal, say y x , with a probability of 1, then the behaviors prescribed by (3)- (7) dene Markovian pure strategies. This proves part (iii) of the proposition.
Let min i∈N δ i >δ. To establish statement (ii), we must show that every σ * ∈ Σ * is an undominated SPE. We do this in two easy-to-prove steps.
Step 1: For every i ∈ N and x ∈ X, dene the value of x for voter i as
Then, at the voter history h ∈ H t v of all periods t with status quo x and proposal y, v
According to (3)- (7), we can write V σ * i (·) as follows:
where the last inequality results from δ i >δ ≥δ i (x, y). By contrapositive, the reverse statement is also true. To see this equivalence when y = x, just note that V
Step 2: At the proposer history h ∈ H t p of any period t starting with status quo x, proposer k cannot gain by deviating from π t k (h) and conforming to σ * k thereafter. Suppose rst that the status quo x belongs to V . In such a case, any proposal by k is rejected by the committee. Therefore, any proposal is a best response and there is no protable deviation from (5).
If x / ∈ V , then k must compare the value from oering x, u k ( x), with the value from oering any other policy y, V σ * k (x). Thus, it is optimal for k to propose x if u k ( x) > u(x), and any other policy otherwise. This proves that she has no protable deviation from (3) and (4).
By the one-shot deviation principle, Steps 1 and 2 establish that every σ * ∈ Σ * is an undominated SPE, thus proving part (ii) of Proposition 1. Let Σ * i be the set of collections {(π For every proposer history h ∈ H t p , let Π t k (h) be the nite set of degenerate probability distributions, π t k (h), satisfying conditions (3)-(5). 6 Similarly, for every voter history h ∈ H t v , let v t i (h) ∈ {0, 1} be uniquely dened by conditions (6)-(7). Then, dene G m as the legislative-bargaining game where the action set of proposer k at proposer history h ∈ H t p is
and the action set of player i at voter history h ∈ H t v is the singleton
m is an innite-horizon game with a nite number of possible actions at each history. Fudenberg and Levine (1983) Σ * includes a set of pure-strategy MPEs and a strategically stable set. Two remarks are in order here. First, beyond the interpretation of vNM stable sets, part (iii) also contributes to the growing literature on the existence of pure-strategy MPEs and the characterization of equilibrium absorbing sets in innite-horizon legislative-bargaining games with an evolving status quo. 8 The second remark concerns strategic stability. Contrary to the denitions of stable sets provided in Mertens (1989 Mertens ( , 1991 and Hillas (1990) , Kohlberg' and Mertens' (1986) denition fails to satisfy one of the requirements for strategic stability, namely backward induction. Having established subgame perfection in part (ii), it is however sucient and more natural to look for an equilibrium renement that captures the other aspects of strategic stability; Kohlberg's and Mertens' (1986) stable set does so.
A brief inspection of the proof of Proposition 1 reveals that both internal and external stabilities play a decisive role in the denition of Σ * . We end this note with some observations about these conditions. Internal stability is in fact a necessary condition for a set of alternatives to be the absorbing set of an undominated SPE of the bargaining game.
Observation 1 If strategy prole σ is an absorbing, undominated SPE of the bargaining game, then A(σ) satises internal stability.
Proof: Let σ be an absorbing, undominated SPE and suppose that, contrary to the above statement, A(σ) does not satisfy internal stability. This implies that there exist two distinct policies x, y ∈ A(σ) and S ∈ W such that u i (x) > u i (y) for every i ∈ S.
After the implementation of y, proposing (successfully in an undominated SPE) x would therefore make any proposer in S strictly better-o than proposing any other policy that would not change the status quo y. This is a contradiction with σ being a SPE.
While combining external stability with internal stability is sucient to obtain the properties stated in Proposition 1, external stability is not a necessary condition. Indeed, a set of alternatives that is internally but not externally stable may have those properties. A simple example shows this.
Example 1 Let N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} and X = {w, x, y, z}, and let W be the 8 See Duggan and Kalandrakis (2007) , and Diermeier and Fong (2009a,b) , for instance. set of majority coalitions. Voters' preferences over X are as follows: Note rst of all that {z} is a stable set of (N, W) and, by Proposition 1, is an absorbing set of strategically stable SPEs of the corresponding bargaining game for any prole of payo functions {u i (·)} i=1,...,6 . Consider now {w, x, y}. This set of alternative is internally stable but not externally stable (z dominates all its elements). One can easily show that, if players' payos satisfy:
, ∀i ∈ {1, 3}, the bargaining game with recognition probabilities p i = 1/3, ∀i ∈ N , has a stable set of undominated SPEs, σ, such that A(σ) = {w, x, y} when min i δ i is suciently close to 1.
